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Introduction
Anti-American terrorism is an important subset of transnational terrorist activity.
1 As shown in Figure 1 , terrorism directed against U.S. interests was a constant threat between 1970 and 2007. 2 During this time period the U.S. was the target of terrorist groups with various ideological profiles hailing from both Western countries and the developing world. For instance, U.S.
interests were attacked by the left-wing Greek November 17 Revolutionary Organization, the Philippine Moro Islamic Liberation Front and the nationalist-separatist Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (LaFree et al., 2009 ).
-Figure 1 here-
Shortly after the 9/11 attacks, U.S. President George W. Bush (2001) asked: "Why do they [i.e.,
the terrorists] hate us?" This questions is also at the heart of several academic contributions examining the roots of anti-American terrorism. These studies link its genesis to the dominance of the U.S. in the international political system (e.g., Volgy et al., 1997; Sobek and Braithwaite, 2005) , the involvement of the U.S. in domestic conflicts, be it through military aid or interventions (e.g., Pape, 2003; Neumayer and Plümper, 2011) , and the ill economic-cultural effects of globalization projected onto the world by the U.S. (e.g., Cronin, 2003) .
In this contribution we relate the emergence of anti-American terrorism to a largely overlooked aspect of globalization, the rise of market-capitalism. 3 While we acknowledge the pacifying 1 Transnational terrorism involves more than one country. Transnational anti-U.S. terrorism is activity by foreign individuals and groups against U.S. interests (U.S. diplomatic personnel, business, embassies, tourists etc.). 2 The data used to construct this graph are described in Section 3.
3 Throughout this contribution, market-capitalism refers to an economic system characterized by a high level of contract-intensity, "where most citizens regularly obtain goods and services contracting with strangers located in a market" (Mousseau, 2012:475) rather than from, e.g., relatives, friends or patrons. Note that most economies are mixed-economies in that individuals rely on both markets and social networks to carry out transactions. However, the relative importance of markets and networks may substantially differ. Here, economic systems in which the role of markets is highly emphasized are characterized as market-capitalist. Finally, note that effects of higher levels of market-capitalist development in the sense of the "peace-throughcapitalism thesis" (Schneider and Gleditsch, 2010:108) , we also consider the potentially destabilizing effects of a transition towards market-capitalism, where these effects may be felt in the political, economic and cultural sphere of non-market economies undergoing such a transition. This latter idea has been voiced earlier by Mousseau (2002 Mousseau ( -2003 in his-hitherto untested-theory of the anti-market roots of anti-U.S. terrorism:
" [The] social origins of terror are rooted less in poverty-or growing discontent with U.S. foreign policy-and more in […] intense antimarket resentment directed primarily against the epitome of market civilization: the United States."
Linking capitalist development to anti-U.S. terrorism is furthermore motivated by the decidedly anti-capitalist symbolism associated with the 9/11 attacks on the New York World Trade Center which was always considered an icon of U.S. economic strength. What is more, many antiAmerican terrorist groups-be they left-wing or Islamist-have spread anti-capitalist rhetoric.
For instance, Osama bin Laden explained his fight against the United States in an al-Jazeera broadcast on February 11, 2003 (BBC, 2003 as follows:
"They [i.e., the American soldiers] only fight for capitalists, usury takers and the merchants of arms and oil, including the gang of crime at the White House."
Motivated by this discussion, we examine the relationship between capitalist development and anti-American terrorism. We hypothesize that higher levels of capitalist developmentconsistent with the idea of a capitalist peace between market economies-coincide with less antiAmerican terrorism (due to increased economic interdependencies and a convergence of values and institutions that favor peace), while the process of marketization leads to more antiAmerican terrorism. We argue that the latter effect is due to the opposition of various interest groups (the old elite, their clientele, politico-economic modernization losers and traditionalists and the religious) to the marketization process, which stems from the negative distributional effects (due to the decline of clientalism, increased economic vulnerability and insecurity and the inflow of American values and ideas) that arise for them due to the rise of capitalism.
we use the terms "capitalism" and "market-capitalism" synonymously throughout this contribution, following the definition mentioned above.
Consequently, anti-market groups may resort to anti-U.S. terrorism to voice dissent, rollback pro-capitalist reforms and limit the Americanization of local communities (i.e., to preserve local traditions, values and religions). These groups deliberately target the U.S. as the main proponent of modern capitalism, globalization, modernity and the Western way of life.
An empirical examination using panel data for 149 countries between 1970 and 2007 and further (system-level) time-series data indeed provides robust evidence that the U.S. is less likely to be targeted by citizens and terrorist groups originating from market economies (beneficial leveleffect), but that the transition towards a market economy incites anti-American resentment (destabilizing rate-of-change-effect). Policywise, this suggests that while the United States may ultimately benefit from (peacefully) subsidizing and propagating the establishment of marketcapitalist economies, the disruptive political, economic and cultural effects of marketization in non-capitalist societies should not be disregarded.
The remainder of this contribution is organized as follows. In Section 2 we discuss the nexus between market-capitalist development and anti-American terrorism. In Section 3 we describe the variables and empirical method used to statistically examine this nexus using (country-level) panel data. Section 4 presents and discusses our findings. In Section 5 we provide further time-
series evidence, where we analyze the relationship between market-capitalism and anti-American terrorism on the system-level. Section 6 concludes.
Market-Capitalism and the Origins of Anti-American Terrorism

The Level of Market-Capitalism and Anti-American Terrorism
Recent empirical contributions find that capitalist countries are less likely to experience interstate and intrastate conflict (Gartzke, 2007; De Soysa and Fjelde, 2010; Mousseau, 2012) .
Analogous to this idea of a capitalist peace, we argue that market-capitalist economies (i.e., countries with high levels of market-capitalist development) are also less likely to produce antiAmerican terrorism.
The capitalist peace literature offers several pathways through which capitalism may be conducive to peace. 4 First, capitalism creates economic interdependencies, e.g., through trade or the international division of labor (Schneider, 2013) . Such linkages make it less attractive to attack because the negative economic consequences of an attack are likely to backfire on the attacker. What is more, the beneficial effects of economic interdependence increase with the level of economic development (e.g., due to a higher trade volume and lower transaction costs), making it even less attractive for highly developed to attack each other (Hegre, 2000) . Second, the ways of capitalist exchange are closely associated with the creation of values and institutions that are conducive to peace. For instance, Mousseau (2002 Mousseau ( -2003 and Mousseau and Mousseau, (2008) argue that impersonal contractual exchange-a main feature of market economies-leads to the emergence of a strong rule of law, sound property rights protection and acceptance for values such as cooperation, tolerance and equity. Such developments make violence less attractive, be it by offering non-violent means of conflict resolution or lowering the overall acceptance of the use of violence.
In line with this discussion, it seems reasonable to expect that countries are also less likely to engage in terrorist conflict when they are both capitalist. 5 In particular, it ought to be less likely that citizens or sub-national (terrorist) groups from countries with similarly high levels of market-capitalist development attack interests of the United States, the main proponent of modern market-capitalism. We also expect foreign governments to be more reluctant to permit or even sponsor anti-American terrorism when their own economies are capitalistically organized.
First, there tends to be a close economic interdependence between the U.S. and other capitalist countries. What is more, the benefits associated with such interdependencies tend to be particularly large (cf. Hegre, 2000) . That is, anti-American terrorism ought to be a particularly expensive venture when it originates from developed market-capitalist societies. Second, 4 Note that we only discuss aspects of the capitalist-peace literature that are relevant to our research question. For reviews of the literature see Schneider and Gleditsch (2010) and Schneider (2013) .
5 While we focus in this study on the issue of anti-American terrorism, an interesting area of future research would be to assess whether capitalist convergence negatively affects the international flow of terrorism for any country dyad. 
The Rise of Market-Capitalism and Anti-American Terrorism
The previous discussion suggests that market-capitalist development may have pacifying effects, so that it also ought to coincide with less anti-American terrorism. However, as recognized by Schneider (2013:5) , beneficial level-effects of economic modernization need to be contrasted with potentially inflammatory rate-of-change-effects. The latter effects may stem from the changing distribution of wealth and socio-political influence that accompanies the transition towards a market-capitalist economy, which may antagonize various segments of society.
Importantly, the losers of marketization may ultimately also resort to anti-American terrorist activity to counter the negative distributional effects of the transition process.
First, anti-American resentment may stem from the decline of clientalism, as extensively discussed in Mousseau (2002 Mousseau ( -2003 . In short, he argues that a transition towards a marketeconomy threatens the clout of the traditional elite, i.e., the "patrons and their lieutenants who hold privileged positions in the old clientalist hierarchies" (Mousseau, 2002 (Mousseau, -2003 . In clientalist economies economic exchange to obtain goods, services and income strongly relies on personal interactions controlled by the traditional elite (e.g., village elders and urban patrons), which provides them with politico-economic rents (e.g., from controlling artificial monopolies, see Kirk, 1983) . The advent of market-capitalism allows for more efficient economic transactions that rely on (impersonal) contracting, which endangers the politico-economic power of the traditional elite. The elite may consequently turn to terrorism for two reasons. For one, they may use terrorism as a means to voice dissent with existing developments-the decline of clientalism-so as to curtail domestic marketization. Here, the U.S., the "epitome of market civilization" (Mousseau, 2002 (Mousseau, -2003 , is a natural target to promote such policy change. For another, terrorism may create new politico-economic rents which may offset losses of the traditional elite due to the rise of market-capitalism and thus consolidate their societal position.
As shown by Kirk (1983) , such rents are routinely obtained by terrorist groups through the use and threat of violence, making terrorism a rational action for (parts of) the elite to change the distribution of resources in their favor (Mousseau, 2011) . As such, anti-American resentment organized by the traditional elite can be understood as a rational response to the negative distributional consequences (i.e., the loss of politico-economic influence) of marketization for this population group.
Second, the rise of market-capitalism may create anti-American resentment due to increased economic vulnerability and further substantial distributional effects accompanying the transition process. For instance, marketization may reduce labor demand (and possibly, wages) in the agricultural sector in favor of the modern industrial sector, thereby also driving more sweeping socio-economic change in the form of rural-urban migration. Ultimately, some segments of society are likely to experience negative economic effects due to the rise of market-capitalism, e.g., in the form poverty, socioeconomic insecurity and unemployment (Stiglitz, 2005) . Similar to the traditional elite, these modernization losers may consequently resort to terrorism.
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Especially when it is directed against the United States, terrorism signals discontent with the economic transition process and may initiate an anti-market rollback. What is more, the modernization losers may also indirectly benefit from the rents terrorism can create. They may pledge loyalty to rent-capturing terrorist groups which provide them-as another form of clientalism-with mental and material rewards (e.g., identity, employment) in return (Mousseau, 2011) . Evidence for this idea is provided by Mousseau (2011) who finds that support for Islamist terrorism is indeed particularly strong among the urban poor-a population group that has obviously not benefited from the marketization process-in developing countries. 6 It seems reasonable to assume that the elite provides the terrorist leaders, while the modernization losers (i.e., the poor and otherwise economically vulnerable) provide the foot soldiers and supporters (e.g., Mousseau, 2011 Indeed, market-capitalism is closely associated with specific ideas and values such as equity, tolerance and religious freedom (Mousseau, 2002 (Mousseau, -2003 Mousseau and Mousseau, 2008) . What is more, through the process of globalization these liberal values (e.g., women's and human rights) spread to the non-Western world (Neumayer and De Soysa, 2007; Dreher et al., 2012) . In consequence, this "import" of Western ideas may have distributional consequences for traditionalist/religious population segments, given that the propagation of an attractive alternative way of life is likely to undermine their politico-economic influence. As before, antiAmerican terrorism may be a rational choice for the traditionalist/religious, so as to limit the cultural modernization that accompanies the economic transition towards a market economy.
Here, any terrorist attack against the United States can be seen as a symbolic attack against modernity and the Western way of life.
Hypotheses
Our literature discussion has shown that it is important to differentiate between level-and rateof-change-effects of market-capitalist development on anti-American terrorism. With respect to the former, we expect anti-American terrorism to be less likely with higher levels of capitalist development. This relationship is due to the close economic interdependence between capitalist societies and the pro-peace values and institutions these societies share. The United States ought to particularly benefit from these effects in the form of reduced terrorist activity against its interests due to its role as the epitome of modern capitalism. This leads to our first hypothesis:
Hypothesis (H1): A higher level of market-capitalist development is associated with less anti-American terrorism.
At the same time, the U.S. may be particularly vulnerable to terrorism emerging from countries undergoing economic transformation towards market-capitalism precisely due to being the role model of capitalism and actively spreading it internationally through globalization. We argue that a number of societal groups (the old elite, traditionalists and the religious and economically vulnerable) lose during the economic transition, e.g., in terms of reduced political influence, income, economic security and cultural-religious control. These groups may resort to terrorism to voice dissent, rollback pro-market developments and capture politico-economic rents, so as to stabilize their own societal position. Here, they are expected to deliberately target the U.S. due to the actual possibility of constraining U.S. influence (e.g., by making U.S. foreign direct investment less attractive) and-probably more important-due to the highly symbolic value attached to an attack against U.S. interests epitomizing globalization, market-capitalism and modernity. In conclusion, this discussion leads to our second hypothesis:
The marketization process is associated with more anti-American terrorism.
Data and Methodology
To empirically test our hypotheses, we compile data on terrorism, market development and further controls for a panel of 149 countries for the period between 1970 and 2007. 7 The summary statistics are reported in Table 1 . A list of countries is given in the appendix.
- Table 1 here-
Dependent Variable
We indicate anti-American terrorism by the number of terrorist attacks by citizens of another country against U.S. targets. Here, we use the source definition of anti-U.S. terrorism, where an attack is assigned to the country of origin of the perpetrator, irrespective of the actual location of the attack. For instance, the 1988 bombing of a U.S. military recreational club in Naples (Italy)
by the Japanese Red Army is then assigned to Japan.
The data come from the International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events (ITERATE)
dataset (Mickolus et al., 2008) . ITERATE is the most widely used dataset covering transnational terrorism due to its consistent coding of terrorist events, where coding is done according to information gathered from the world's newsprint and electronic media (Enders et al., 2011) .
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ITERATE defines terrorism as the use (or threat of use) of anxiety-inducing, extra-normal violence for political purposes by non-state individuals or groups, where the intention of such action is to influence a target group wider than the immediate victims (Mickolus et al., 2008) .
ITERATE excludes terrorist attacks against combatants associated with declared wars, military interventions or guerilla warfare against military targets (Mickolus et al., 2008) .
Main Explanatory Variable
To indicate market-capitalist development, we follow Mousseau (2012) who considers economies to be market-capitalist when most citizens regularly obtain goods and services by contracting with strangers in a market. As in earlier studies (e.g., Mousseau and Mousseau, 2008; Mousseau, 2012) , we operationalize the level of market-capitalism by using annually aggregated data on per capita life insurance contracts in force in (logged) constant U.S. dollars. The data on life insurance are drawn from the Contract Intensity of National Economies Dataset (Mousseau, 2012) . Mousseau (2012:6-8) argues that life insurance data reasonably reflects the overall intensity of market institutionalization because life insurance contracts are purely impersonal and credibility in commitments therefore rests only on third party enforcement. That is, a large volume of per capita life insurance contracts in force tends to signal that a society largely relies on (impersonal) means of contracting and contract enforcement and less on social relationships (e.g., between the patron and his clientele). In line with H1, we expect a higher level of marketcapitalism to be negatively related to anti-American terrorism. The transition towards marketcapitalism is operationalized by the annual change in per capita life insurance contracts. In line with H2, a transition towards market-capitalism ought to coincide with more anti-U.S. terrorism.
As shown in Table 2 , market-capitalist development (as measured by the life insurance data) strongly correlates with a number of important development outcomes. 9 Both with respect to its 8 Enders et al. (2011) show that the other dataset nominally suitable for our purpose, the Global Terrorism Database, suffers from coding inconsistencies, making ITERATE our dataset of choice.
level and change, market institutionalization coincides with higher regulatory quality (linked to sound policies that permit and promote private sector development), a stronger rule of law, lower levels of corruption, reduced economic significance of the agricultural sector, higher levels of urbanization and lower fertility rates.
- Table 2 here-
In line with our theoretical discussion in the previous section, this suggests that market-capitalist development indeed contributes to favorable socio-economic and institutional outcomes (as indicated by, e.g., a strong rule of law, inclusive economic institutions, declining fertility and urbanization) which ultimately ought to make anti-American terrorism less attractive (cf. H1). At the same time, however, the strong correlation between changes in market-capitalist development and development outcomes hints at the adjustment costs that accompany the transition towards a market-capitalist economy, which may very well fuel anti-American resentment (cf. H2). As argued above, first, such resentment may emanate from the decline of clientalism. Clientalism thrives when governments and institutions are weak (Roniger, 2004) , while market-capitalist development creates stronger state institutions (as indicated by, e.g., its
positive correlation with the rule of law or corruption control). Second, the economic losers of marketization and globalization may resort to anti-American terrorism. As indicated by our correlation analysis, marketization may indeed create losers in, e.g., the agricultural sector or rural-urban migration. Finally, anti-American terrorism may also be a consequence of sociocultural modernization accompanying marketization and globalization. Here, the negative association between market-capitalist development and fertility and the positive association between it and the rule of law can be seen as an indication of changing values and traditions (e.g., with respect to the role of women in society and the ways of settling disputes).
As previously suggested by Mousseau (2002 Mousseau ( -2003 and Cronin (2003) , we hypothesize that the U.S. is deliberately targeted due to its important role in globalization and the rise of marketcapitalism. As shown in Figure 2 , the level of market institutionalization in the U.S. in 1970 was indeed markedly above the global average. Considering the change in market-capitalism over time, both the United States and the rest of the world saw a rather steady movement towards higher levels of market institutionalization. Yet, in 2007 the level of market-capitalist development in the U.S. was still substantially higher than the global average. Overall, these stylized facts suggest that the U.S. could indeed be considered a pioneer of marketization.
-Figure 2 here-
Further support for this idea is given in Table 3 . Here, we examine the statistical relationship between U.S. and global average market-capitalist development with methods of time-series analysis. 10 In particular, we are interested in whether the time series are causally related in the Granger sense (Granger, 1969) . Formally, this means testing whether the inclusion of lagged values of an independent variable improves the forecasting performance of a model that also
includes lagged values of the dependent variable (Enders 2010:318) . Beforehand, we need to study whether the variables are stationary and cointegrated so as to specify the model correctly This indicates that the U.S. has indeed been instrumental in spreading capitalism globally, consequently making it plausible-in line with our hypotheses-to link this interaction to the emergence of anti-American terrorism.
- Table 3 here-
Control Variables
To avoid detecting spurious effects of market-capitalist development on anti-U.S. terrorism, we largely follow the model specification of Neumayer and Plümper (2011) by including in our baseline model control variables for population size, geographical distance to the U.S., per capita income, democracy and military dependence from the United States. This speaks to the ideahinted at in the introduction-that the origins of anti-American terrorism may also lie in factors other than market-capitalist development.
Data for (logged) population size are drawn from the PENN World Table ( Heston et al., 2009 ).
More populous countries ought to experience more anti-U.S. attacks due to the existence of a larger pool of (potential) terrorists, terrorist supporters and American victims. Indeed, previous research has found population size to be a robust predictor of terrorism (Gassebner and Luechinger, 2011; Krieger and Meierrieks, 2011) .
Data for geographical distance to the United States come from the CEPII GEODist Database (Mayer and Zignago, 2011) . Distance is indicated by the (logged) distance between Washington, D.C., and the respective foreign country's capital. As argued by Neumayer and Plümper (2011) , the likelihood of an anti-U.S. attack ought to decrease with distance, given that it increases the material costs of attacking.
The PENN World Table provides . Gassebner and Luechinger (2011) argues that, for one, respect for civil liberties may make democracies more vulnerable to terrorism because this respect may restrain curtail counter-terrorism efforts. However, they also suggest that the possibility to peacefully voice and achieve change-e.g., in terms of curtailing U.S. influence and the spread of marketcapitalism-in democracies may reduce the need for terrorism, thus making democracies actually less vulnerable to terrorism. Given these conflictive ideas, we also remain agnostic about the expected effect of democracy on anti-U.S. terrorism. Ultimately, this may improve terrorist mobilization, while at the same time weakening the local government that is militarily dependent from the U.S. as foreign support is likely to decrease with terrorism directed against the foreign sponsor.
As a robustness check, we take into account further economic and political factors which are also suggested as potential terrorism determinants in previous studies (e.g., Piazza, 2008; Gassebner and Luechinger, 2011; Krieger and Meierrieks, 2011 
Empirical Methodology
To test our hypotheses, we run a series of negative binomial regressions, given that our dependent variables are overdispersed (i.e., their variances are larger than their means) count 11 Note that introducing further controls to our estimation model (measuring political proximity to the U.S., economic growth, population growth, domestic military capacity, primary goods exports, ethnic fractionalization, Muslim population share and regime age) does not affect our main findings. These additional robustness checks are available upon request.
data, as shown in Table 1 . 13 Negative binomial regressions are commonly used in studies assessing the determinants of terrorism (Gassebner and Luechinger, 2011; Krieger and Meierrieks, 2011; Neumayer and Plümper, 2011) . All time-variant explanatory variables enter the model in lagged form to minimize endogeneity. Time dummies are included in all estimations to address unit effects and the trending of transnational terrorism over time.
Negative Binomial Regression Results
The negative binomial regression results are reported in Table 4 . With respect to the main explanatory variables of interest, we find that a higher level of market-capitalist development is associated with less anti-American terrorism, while the process of marketization is associated with more anti-American terrorism. These findings are in line with H1 and H2.
For one, the pacifying effect of higher levels of market-capitalist development is consistent with the idea that anti-U.S. terrorism is less likely to originate in countries that are as capitalistically developed as the United States. Possibly, this is due to the close and highly beneficial economic interdependence between market-capitalist societies, where these societies also share similar values and institutions (e.g., tolerance, cooperation, a strong rule of law) that are conducive to peaceful conflict resolution and further reduce the likelihood of anti-market resentment. This suggests that the idea of a capitalist peace that impedes internal and external conflict (e.g., Gartzke, 2007; De Soysa and Fjelde, 2010) may also matter to the patterns of anti-American transnational terrorism.
For another, the process of marketization is found to increase the likelihood of anti-American terrorism developing. As argued before, the resistance of certain population segments (the old elite, traditionalists and the religious and economically vulnerable) to the transition towards market-capitalism, which unfavorably affects their economic and politico-cultural influence, may 13 As another robustness check, we run zero-inflated negative binomial (ZINB) regressions for all specifications reported below. ZINB regressions can be appropriate to accommodate for the fact that there is a large number of zero values (i.e., no anti-U.S. terrorism) in country-cases and the possibility of a reporting bias associated with it (Neumayer and Plümper, 2011:13) . Our ZINB regression results are consistent with the estimates from conventional negative binomial regressions reported in the main text. These results are available upon request.
explain this relationship (e.g., Mousseau, 2002 Mousseau, -2003 . Here, the losers of modernization may intentionally target the United States to effectively voice dissent and rollback pro-market developments by punishing the U.S. for its role in capitalism, globalization and the Americanization of their societies (e.g., in the form of women empowerment, secularization and consumerism). In so doing, the losers of economic transition may be able to consolidate their societal position.
Notably, the pacifying and inflammatory effects of market-capitalist development (as indicated by the incidence-rate-ratios (IRR) reported in Model 6 in Table 4 ) are both substantive.
According to the IRR, a one-unit increase in the level of market-capitalism (change in marketcapitalism) is associated with a 28 percent decrease (56 percent increase) in anti-U.S. terrorism.
This suggests that both the beneficial level-effects and the destabilizing rate-of-change-effects of market-capitalist development need to be taken into account. As argued earlier by Mousseau (2002 Mousseau ( -2003 and Schneider (2013) , this suggests that capitalism does not need to be a purely peaceful force, especially during times of rapid socio-economic, institutional and cultural change that may accompany the marketization process.
- Table 4 here-
The results for the baseline controls are robust across different specifications. First, we find that anti-American terrorism is positively associated with population size. Presumably, this is due to a scale effect, e.g., as a larger population coincides with a larger pool of terrorists, terrorist supporters and American victims. Second, military dependence from the United States results in more anti-American terrorism. Possibly, terrorist groups with domestic political goals deliberately attack the U.S. not only to counter the marketization of their societies but also to raise the costs of American military support for a foreign government, which in turn is likely to weaken this government and raise the possibility of terrorist success at home (Neumayer and Plümper, 2011) . Third, our results suggest that per capita income is a positive predictor of terrorism. This is in line with Sanchez-Cuenca and De La Calle (2012) . Potentially, antiAmerican dissidents resort to terrorism as their main strategy in richer countries due to their inability to capture territory. By contrast, in poor countries it is more attractive for an insurgent group to seize territory and wage an open rebellion to implement an anti-market and antiAmerican agenda. Fourth, distance to the U.S. and democratic institutions share no statistically significant association with anti-American terrorism. Finally, with respect to the additional control variables, we find that the prevalence of domestic political instability (state failure) is robustly associated with more anti-U.S. terrorism. This speaks to Piazza (2008) who finds that instability creates a political vacuum that facilitates terrorist activity. Government size is positively related to anti-American terrorism, possibly due to rent-seeking behavior by terrorist groups (Kirk, 1983) . Trade openness and oil exports, by contrast, share no substantial connection with anti-American violence.
As a robustness check, we consider whether the end of the Cold War as a major structural change in the international system affects our findings. As noted by Shughart (2006) , the end of the Cold War saw the decline of left-wing terrorism and the rise of Islamist terrorism. This development coincided to some extent with a transfer of terrorism to less developed countries, also with respect to anti-American terrorism (Enders and Sandler, 2005) . Potentially, these changes may have also affected the role of market-capitalist development in explaining antiAmerican terrorism.
Our empirical findings are reported in Table 5 . In line with Enders and Sandler (2005) , we find evidence that anti-American terrorism transferred to less developed countries after the end of the Cold War. Our results, however, do not indicate that the end of the Cold War mattered to the role of capitalism in explaining anti-U.S. terrorism. We still find evidence of significant and substantive positive (negative) level-(rate-of-change-)effects for the Cold War and post-Cold War era. According to the IRR (Models 3 and 4 in Table 5 ), a one-unit increase in the level of market-capitalism (change in market-capitalism) is associated with a 36 percent decrease (68 percent increase) in anti-U.S. terrorism during the Cold War; after the end of the Cold War, a one-unit increase in the level of market-capitalism (change in market-capitalism) yields a 21 percent reduction (81 percent increase) in terrorism. This suggests that both left-wing extremism and the rise of religious fundamentalism following the "Islamic revival"-both anti-market and anti-American ideologies spawning anti-American terrorism-can be (at least partly) understood as reactions to globalization and the economic transition towards market-capitalism.
- Table 5 here-
Further Time-Series Evidence at the System Level
Motivation
The evidence presented in the previous section suggests that higher levels of market-capitalism lead to less anti-American terrorism, whereas the marketization process results in more anti-U.S.
attacks. These effects were identified at the country-level, which is the standard approach to study the origins of anti-American terrorism. However, some researchers (e.g., Volgy et al., 1997) suggest that an analysis at the system-level may also prove helpful by conceptualizing antiAmerican terrorism as a "systemic disturbance […] to disrupt the global order" (Volgy et al., 1997:208-209 ).
14 With respect to the capitalism-terrorism nexus, following this view we can hypothesize that anti-American terrorism can be understood as a violent systemic response to the existing global politico-economic order characterized by U.S.-led globalization and marketization.
Why may a systemic perspective add to our analysis? Consider anti-American terrorism originating in Western Europe. In this part of the world anti-U.S. terrorism was particularly prominent in the 1970s and 1980s, being carried out primarily by left-wing groups (e.g., the
German Red Army Faction or the French Action Directe). Clearly, left-wing terrorism was oftentimes motivated by an anti-American ideology (Communism) and "bitter opposition to market (liberal) values" (Mousseau, 2002 (Mousseau, -2003 . However, Western Europe was-at least during our observation period-characterized by already high levels of market-capitalist development, making it unlikely that terrorist groups in Western Europe attacked the U.S. to prevent the further marketization of their own societies. Yet, the rise of market-capitalism may have motivated their activities after all, albeit from a systemic rather than domestic perspective.
Left-wing terrorist groups in the Western world saw their anti-American activities as part of a 14 System-level studies of terrorism argue that variation at the system-level (i.e., structural determinants) rather than country-level (in, e.g., democratic or economic development) explains the patterns of terrorism. Examples of system-level analyses of terrorism are O'Brien (1996), Volgy et al. (1997) and Sobek and Braithwaite (2005) . Among the factors contributing to the emergence of terrorism considered in these studies are the involvement of countries (especially the U.S. and its main rivals) in foreign policy crises, the global strength of the U.S. and its competitors and the global support for U.S. leadership.
global struggle against U.S. imperialism and capitalism (Shughart, 2006) . Similarly, terrorism by Islamist groups-the other important terrorism wave producing anti-American terrorism-can be conceptualized as a response to globalization and marketization transcending national borders (Mousseau, 2002 (Mousseau, -2003 . Indeed, many Islamist insurgencies (e.g., in Afghanistan, Pakistan and the Northern Caucasus) have attracted foreign fighters who were motivated by transnational factors-the defense of the Islamic World from American/Western intrusion-rather than idiosyncratic politico-economic conditions prevailing in their home countries (Williams, 2011) .
Given these considerations, it seems fruitful to also examine the relationship between marketcapitalism and anti-American terrorism from a systemic perspective. This ought to complement the panel evidence reported beforehand. In line with our previously outlined hypotheses, we expect a higher global level of market-capitalism to correspond with less anti-American terrorism, while a global economic transition towards market institutionalization ought to result in more anti-American terrorism.
Data and Methodology
In order to examine these hypotheses, we collect system-aggregated data for the period between 1970 and 2007. The summary statistics are reported in Table 6 .
- Table 6 hereAs before, data on anti-American terrorism and market-capitalist development come from ITERATE and the Contract Intensity of National Economies Dataset. Here, anti-American terrorism is measured by the annual global count of transnational terrorist attacks against U.S.
interests. The (logged) global average of annually aggregated per capita life insurance contracts in force corresponds to the systemic level of market-capitalist development in a given year, while the change in this variable between two years indicates the global speed of marketization.
To account for other systemic factors potentially influencing the patterns of anti-American terrorism, we follow Sobek and Braithwaite (2005) by controlling for American dominance, the power differential between the U.S. and the rest of the world, the diplomatic standing of the United States and the Cold War era. The operationalization of these variables follows Sobek and Braithwaite (2005) and is documented in Table 6 .
As in O'Brien (1996) and Sobek and Braithwaite (2005) , we estimate a series of ARMA models to examine the systemic influence of market-capitalist development on anti-American terrorism (net of the impact of the controls). ARMA models are especially suited to modelling time dependence which is likely to matter for our analysis, given that the annual terrorism observations are unlikely to be independent from each other. In ARMA models the disturbances are allowed to follow a linear autoregressive (AR) moving-average (MA) specification. 15 By accounting for time dependence, we minimize the potential for underestimating standard errors which would otherwise affect hypothesis testing. Also, Sobek and Braithwaite (2005:144) argue that ARMA models have good small sample properties, so that the small number of observations (T=37) is less likely to affect inferences. Finally, we use robust standard errors because the use of a count variable as a regressand may violate (e.g., in the form of heteroskedasticity) the ARMA assumption of normally distributed disturbances.
Empirical Findings
The ARMA regression results are reported in Table 7 . With respect to the main variables of interest, we find that a higher global level of market-capitalism is associated with fewer antiAmerican incidents, suggesting that economic interdependencies and similarities in institutions and values are ultimately a disincentive for anti-American terrorism. At the same time, however, a transition towards market-capitalism results in more anti-U.S. terrorism, indicating that socioeconomic modernization strain (i.e., the decline of clientalism, the ill effects of economic transformation and the associated threats to local religion and culture) motivates anti-U.S.
resentment. Overall, the system-level evidence is thus very much in line with our panel analysis findings at the country-level.
- Table 7 hereWith respect to control variables, our findings resemble those reported by Sobek and Braithwaite (2005) . First, we find that anti-American terrorism increases with American dominance. This suggests that dominance makes it more difficult for revisionist actors to change the status quo through conventional means, making terrorism a more attractive option. Second, higher difference in military capacity between the U.S. and the rest of the world leads to more anti-15 ARMA models are discussed in more detail in Enders (2010) .
American terrorism. Presumably, such a power differential invites anti-American terrorism because it creates greater levels of dissatisfaction among weaker actors in the system, while also limiting the possibilities of changing the status quo conventionally. Third, a convergence of preferences towards the United States (i.e., a more favorable diplomatic standing of the U.S.)
leads to a decrease in attacks. Presumably, such preference convergence coincides with less conflict and thus less need to resort to terrorism to foster political change. Finally, we do not find that anti-American attacks were more common during the Cold War era.
Conclusion
U.S. President George W. Bush (2001) shortly after the 9/11 attacks asked: "Why do they hate Dependent variable is the number of anti-U.S. terrorist attacks. Constant not reported. All models include year dummies (not reported). Robust standard errors clustered over countries in parentheses. Model (6) reports the incidence-rate ratios for Model (1). *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. . 1970 1990 and (4) report the incidence-rate ratios for Models (1) and (2), respectively. *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. Notes: CINC (Composite Index of National Capability) score drawn from an update of Singer (1987) . The CINC score is a composite index indicating a country's demographic, economic and military strength (e.g., in terms of population size, energy consumption and military personnel). Chief revisionist power is the country with the combination of the highest CINC score and lowest affinity with the United States at a given year (USSR/Russia in 1970 -1971 and 1977 -1990 China in 1972 China in -1976 China in and from 1991 China in -2007 . Affinity reflects the similarity of state preferences based on their voting positions in the U.N. General Assembly. The affinity data is taken from the Affinity of Nations Dataset (http://dss.ucsd.edu/~egartzke/htmlpages/data.html). Standard errors robust to symmetric non-normality (including heteroskedasticity) in parentheses. *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
